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Abstract
Mainstream macroeconomics has pursued micro foundedmodels based
on the explicit optimization by representative agents. The result has been
a long and wasteful detour. But elements of the Lucas critique are rele-
vant, also for heterodox economists. Challenging common heterodox views
on microeconomics and formalization, this paper argues that (i) economic
models should not be based purely on empirically observed regularities,
(ii) heterodox economists must be able to tell an integrated story about
goal-oriented micro behavior in a specic macro environment, and (iii)
relatively simple analytical models have an essential role to play.
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1 Introduction
There can be no single, correct theory or model of the economy. The economy
is not a well-dened object and  even if it were  a theory does not aim to
provide a complete picture of reality. As Joan Robinson noted, a map on a
scale of one to one would be useless. Models and theories simplify and focus
attention on specic aspects.
Equally self-evident, it seems to me, is the claim that there can be no single,
correct method for gaining insights into the operation of the economy. We need
broad historical analysis, detailed case studies, institutional work, data collec-
tion, statistical analysis, mathematical models, experimental evidence, and com-
puter simulations, to mention just some of the useful ingredients. Researchers
focus on di¤erent issues, approach them from di¤erent angles and employ dif-
ferent tools. The internal consistency of their work must be checked and its
relevance, importance and implications should be debated.
I am not sure whether these views qualify as pluralism, or if so, what kind
of pluralism. In fact, the merits of some kinds of pluralism seem questionable.
Surely, not any school of thought should be considered legitimate. Should we
welcome, in the name of pluralism, Chicago-school views of unemployment as
the voluntary choice of workers to go on vacation when wages are low? To take
an example outside economics, should we welcome creationism as an alternative
to evolution? More generally, what do we do if di¤erent theories make mutually
inconsistent claims about the same phenomenon? Diversity pluralism, more-
over, seems to go hand in hand with a clubbiness that can be quite disturbing
(or in some cases almost hilarious if one is in that mood). The manifestations
include argument by authority and the insistent self-labeling and demarcation
vis-a-vis other schools. The upshot can be to close o¤ debate.
A general methodological discussion of pluralism is beyond my expertise,
however.1 This note has a more limited purpose: I want to discuss micro-
economic foundations and make a plea for pluralism (or eclecticism) in this
particular area. Heterodox economists are united in the rejection of the main-
stream approach to micro foundations, but some of the problems and divisions
that characterize heterodox macro derive from the same questions that derailed
the mainstream: the role of goal oriented behavior and the connection between
micro and macro. A related, but separate controversy concerns the use of formal
methods.
2 Macroeconomics
Contemporary, mainstream macroeconomics is guided by its quest for micro-
economic foundations. Older style Keynesian macroeconomics, it is claimed,
failed in this respect, and the Lucas critique demonstrates the implications of
1See e.g. Dow (1997), Sent (2003), King (2004), Freeman and Kliman (2006), and Davis
(2007, 2008).
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this failure: reliable theory and empirical work must be based on structurally
invariant parameters that can only come from explicit micro foundations.
Essentially, the Lucas critique has three elements:
 The claim that economic behavior is goal oriented, has an intertempo-
ral dimension, and is inuenced by expectations; household consumption,
for instance, depends on expected future income; rms investment on
expected future demand.
 The argument that reduced-form equations that link current decisions to
observable variables will reect the expectations (as well as the underlying
goals) of the decision makers; shifts in expectations induced, for instance,
by changes in economic policy will therefore a¤ect the equations and
render them unstable.
 The recommendation that in the face of these instability problems, eco-
nomic models should be based on explicit microeconomic optimization
since, unlike reduced-form equations, structural elements like preference
orderings and production functions are invariant to changes in policy
regimes.2
The attempt to implement the recommendation (the third element) has led
to the sorry state of macro with its suggestion that modern economies should
be analyzed through the lens of an innitely-lived, utility maximizing represen-
tative household. This suggestion is peculiar, to say the least. Goal-oriented
behavior is not the same as the full intertemporal utility maximization with per-
fect foresight (or rational expectations). Moreover, even if individual preferences
could be taken as well-dened, exogenous and stable over time, microeconomic
rationality imposes very weak constraints on the properties of aggregate excess
demand functions. The use of a representative agent "is not simply an analytical
convenience as often explained, but is both unjustied and leads to conclusions
which are usually misleading and often wrong" (Kirman, 1992, p. 117). One
may note in particular that if the behavior of the representative agent is to
describe aggregate outcomes, the appropriate denition of the agent will itself
typically depend on the policy regime. Thus, the representative-agent mod-
els are themselves subject to the Lucas critique.3 In short, the Lucas inspired
research program has been a failure.
The problems with the suggested solution do not, however, invalidate the
rst two claims. In fact discussions of the importance of expectations and the
potential instability of behavioral relations the second claim are ubiquitous
2With the additional recommendations that economic modelers impose rational expecta-
tions and that policy makers follow predictable rules.
One can debate whether the recommendations should be included as part of the critique.
However, it is mainly the perceived implications the recommendations that distinguish the
Lucas critique from similar arguments about the potential breakdown of empirical regularities
(e.g. Goodharts law).
3Skott and Davis (2012) discuss these issues in relation to the use of representative agent
models for the evaluation of climate change.
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in the heterodox literature and this claim should not be contentious. Heterodox
positions with respect to the rst claim seem more mixed or ambiguous. There
are clearly exceptions but heterodox economists often play down the role of goal
oriented behavior. Dutt (2003), for example, describes the "neostructuralist"
approach as dened by
(1) starting with some basic and commonly used accounting identi-
ties; (2) adding simple rules of behavior of individuals or groups de-
rived from detailed empirical investigation; and (3) examining their
consequences to analyze the performance and evolution of the system
(p. 57)
The second step in his description is the crucial one. This is where behavior
enters, and the emphasis is on simple rules and empirical investigation. There is
no mention of any kind of goal orientation. In fact, the neostructuralist approach
is explicitly contrasted with an approach based on optimizing agents which, Dutt
argues, characterizes both Walrasian and Post Walrasian theories. The term
heterodox is used to describe contributions "that do not invoke the optimizing
agent (even in the sense of bounded rationality)" (p. 54). Thus, according to
Dutt the use of goal oriented behavior optimization with imperfections and
bounded rationality seems to fall squarely within mainstream economics.4
Another strand of literature discards macroeconomic modeling and insists
that the behavior of aggregate economies reects the emergent properties of
an underlying agent-based system.5 This strand can be seen as a reaction to
the central role of the representative agent in the mainstream model but agent-
based models also tend to eschew optimization, being populated by agents that
typically follow simple rules of thumb.
3 Goal oriented behavior
The shortcomings of mainstream macroeconomics do not imply that goal ori-
ented behavior does not exist. nor that behavioral considerations  including
goal orientation are irrelevant for macroeconomic models. On the contrary, it
would seem desirable to make the behavioral assumptions explicit and then to
try to exclude models based on implausible assumptions. This argument may
4Davis (2008) makes a similar point,
Consider, for example, the theory of choice as a core doctrine. Behavioural
economists think the theory of choice in economics is wrong, but rather than
abandon the theory of choice altogether, they want to revise it. Most heterodox
economists, however, simply believe the theory of choice should be abandoned
for non-individualistic conceptualisations of the economic process that have more
in common with other social sciences.
5Colander one the proponents of this approach views the agent-based approach as part
of a new Post Walrasian economics or complexity economics (Colander, 2003; Holt et al.,
2011).
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seem su¢ ciently vague to be unobjectionable. In my view, however, the debate
on the modeling of investment shows that it has bite.6
3.1 Investment functions
Like other post-Keynesian theories, the Kaleckian growth model regards the
rate of capital utilization as a key determinant of accumulation. As a simple
formalization, let
g = f(u; z); fu > 0 (1)
where g is the rate of growth of the capital stock (the rate of net accumulation),
u denotes the utilization rate, fu is the partial derivative with respect to u,
and z is a vector of other variables that may inuence investment (the prot
share, for instance, or autonomous elements of animal spirits). The distinctive
Kaleckian assumption is a low sensitivity of investment to changes in utilization.
If s is the average rate of saving out of income, it is assumed that
fu < s
Y
K
(2)
where Y=K is the output-capital ratio. This Keynesian stability conditionis
critical for the properties of the model.
The average saving rate may itself depend on other variables, including the
prot share and household wealth. Empirically, however, the gross saving rate in
most advanced countries lies between 0.15 and 0.25. With an output-capital ra-
tio of about 0.5, the sensitivity fu is therefore restricted to be less than 0.1. This
restriction would not be objectionable for short run analysis. But the Kaleck-
ian models extend the restriction to the long-run e¤ects of a permanent rise in
utilization. The extension implies shocks to aggregate demand - a change in
saving rates, for instance - can lead to permanent and quantitatively signicant
changes in the rate of capital utilization. Indeed these large induced changes in
utilization provide the mechanism behind the celebrated stagnationistresults.
Consider a simple example. Suppose a rm has seen the demand for its
output grow at a constant rate of 10 percent a year and that to meet the demand,
it has been accumulating capital at the same rate, keeping the utilization rate
of its capital stock at a constant rate, say 80 percent. Now suppose that the
growth of demand slows down to about 5 percent a year. The restriction fu < 0:1
implies (convergence to) a utilization rate below 30 percent. And had the growth
of demand dropped by another 3 percentage points, the rm would continue to
accumulate capital at the rate of at least 2 percent, despite having a utilization
rate that converges to zero.
A sustained change of 5 percentage points in the growth rate may seem large
for an economy as a whole, although not unprecedented (as illustrated by the
Japanese economy). For individual industries and rms, however, the sustained
changes are often much larger than that. Utilization rates, by contrast, uctuate
6Recent contributions include Hein et al. (2012) and Skott (2012).
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around a fairly constant rate.7 There is a simple explanation for this observed
regularity: a prot-oriented rm only invests if the increase in the capital stock
raises the expected future prots. Why invest in more machines if the rm
already has an abundance of unused capacity?
3.2 Limitations of empirical evidence
This issue, it could be argued, should not be decided on a priori grounds but on
the basis of empirical evidence (cf. Dutts appeal to empirical investigation as
the basis for behavioral equations). The evidence, in fact, does not support the
Kaleckian position.8 Moreover, a purely empirical approach runs into problems:
the Lucas critique correctly identies pitfalls in the interpretation of reduced-
form regressions.
Consider two economies. In economy A output uctuates randomly around
a constant growth trend,
log Yt = t+ "t (3)
where "t is a random shock. The constant long-run rate of growth could be
the result of policy intervention and labor constraints (the labor force growing
at the rate ); for present purposes, however, the mechanism behind (3) does
not matter. Economy B is not anchored in this way; its growth rate follows a
random walk,
 log Yt =  log Yt 1 + t (4)
Assume that rms adjust their capital stock based on the expected growth of
demand and the current deviations from desired utilization:9
logKt+1   logKt =  logKt = gt = et + (log ut   log u) (5)
where e is the expected growth rate of demand.
The growth of demand follows very di¤erent stochastic processes in the two
economies and, by assumption, has been following these processes for a long
time. One does not have to be a Chicago economist to believe that the di¤er-
ences will a¤ect expectations. Consider the simple case in which all rms in an
economy experience the same shocks; that is, equations (3) and (4) describe the
experience of individual rms in the two economies. In this case it seems plausi-
ble to assume that rms in economy A will recognize the long-run constancy of
7An interesting paper by Nikiforos (2011) points out that standard measures of utilization
may show no trend by construction. Given the scale of the variation in utilization rates
predicted by the Kaleckian analysis the measurement problems are insignicant for present
purposes. Nikifoross own theoretical analysis of the endogenous determination of the desired
utilization provides no support for the Kaleckian position.
8The study by Lavoie et al. (2004) is awed and o¤ers no support for the Kaleckian position
(see Skott 2012). Schoder (2012) nds some evidence of path dependency in the utilization
rate, but quantitatively it is small and the estimated model violates the Kaleckian restrictions;
Skott and Zipperer (2010) reject the Kaleckian restrictions.
9Kaleckians may reject this assumption (or argue that the desired utilization rate is path
dependent). This disagreement is irrelevant for present purposes: the point of the example is
not to nd to the correctinvestment function but to illustrate the regime-dependence of the
reduced-form investment function.
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the average growth rate and base their expectations on that. Firms in economy
B, by contrast, are likely to realize that their growth rate of demand has a lot
of persistence. Thus, as a simplifying assumption10
et =
 in economy A
 log Yt 1 in economy B
(6)
Substituting (6) into (5), we get two di¤erent reduced-form investment func-
tions. In economy A,
gt = a+ b log ut (7)
where a =     log u and b = : In economy B,11
gt = a+ b log ut + c log ut 1 (8)
where a =   log u; b = 1 +  and c =  1.
Empirical estimates of the investment function comes from advanced economies
with relatively stable trend rates of growth, that is, from economies that may
look roughly like economy A. The benchmark Kaleckian model, however, de-
scribes a dual economy in which a shock to the saving rate shifts the long-run
rate of growth; in other words, an economy that is more like economy B. And
here is the nub: reduced-form regressions based on economy A are biased in
favor of nding Kaleckian results, but these estimates say little about the de-
terminants of investment in a regime in which the long-run rate of growth is
variable or even about the e¤ect of a one-o¤, persistent change to a new long-
run rate of growth. The reduced-form equation (7) is valid only as long as the
expected growth of demand remains constant.
It may seem surprising, in the light of this analysis, that estimated invest-
ment functions do not favor the Kaleckian specication. The reason, however,
may be quite intuitive: although the average growth rate in advanced economies
may have a fairly stable trend, this is not the case for individual rms. Firms
make the investment decisions, and the shocks to the growth of demand for a
single rm can be quite persistent, even if not quite the random walk posited
by the simple economy B.
10These are the rational expectations. There is no justication for the imposition of
rational expectations at all times, as in most mainstream models, but that does not mean
that rational expectations are never justied. Persistent and signicant expectational mistakes
are implausible in hypothetical economies that follow well-dened stable growth paths. This
statement should not be controversial (Harrods warranted growth path is a trajectory of this
kind, as are Joan Robinsons mythical ages). The general point, which requires neither steady
growth nor rational expectations, is simply that the properties of the economy in which agents
operate will inuence the way they form expectations.
11From (5) and (6) it follows that
gt   gt 1 =  log Yt 1   logKt 1 + (log ut   log u)
=  log ut 1 + (log ut   log u)
=   log u + (1 + ) log ut   log ut 1
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To illustrate, let the aggregate growth rate follow (3) but assume that rm-
level expectations are governed by
ei;t =  + ( log Yi;t 1   ) (9)
where the subscript i denotes rm level,  is the trend growth of aggregate
demand (cf. equation (3)), and  captures the persistence of the deviations of
rm-level from aggregate growth. The idiosyncratic rm-level shocks cancel out
in aggregation and, using (5) and (9), aggregate investment can be written as
gt = (1  )   log u + (+ ) log ut    log ut 1 + gt 1 (10)
This equation can be used to nd a long-run between utilization and accumu-
lation: setting gt = gt 1 = g and ut = ut 1 = u, we get
g =  +

1   (log u  log u
) (11)
According to this equation a sustained increase in g requires an increase in u; the
long-run sensitivity of accumulation to a change in utilization is =(1 ): This
estimate may violate the Kaleckian restriction even if  < s. But in fact the
regression underestimates the true long-run sensitivity. A permanent rise in the
aggregate growth rate of demand will a¤ect the formation of expectations: once
the parameter  in (9) equals the new aggregate growth rate, the accumulation
rate will adjust without any increase in utilization.
The examples are special and stylized but they carry two important much
more general lessons:
 While rejecting Lucass recommmendations, the rst rst two elements of
the Lucas critique are relevant, also for heterodox models; we should not
build economic models purely on empirically observed regularities.
 Aggregate outcomes are not decided by a representative rm whose de-
mand follows the same process as aggregate demand.12
3.3 Historical context and uncertainty
Post-Keynesians and other heterodox macro economists are well aware that
the investment function (and other behavioral equations) may be unstable. In
Dutts words, the behavioral relations "are context and time dependent, which
means that the same model cannot necessarily be used for all economies" (2003,
p.59). In a similar vein, Davis (2008, p. 360) argues that "individuals are socially
embedded rather than atomistic", and numerous authors have made the point
that profound uncertainty and animal spirits a¤ect investment decisions and
may lead to instability.
12This point is related to the Phelps-Lucas analysis of island economies and the di¢ culty
of disentangling ideosyncratic and general shocks.
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I have no disagreement with these arguments. One can accept, rst, the con-
text dependence, the social embeddedness, and the importance of uncertainty
and animal spirits without abandoning the notion that rms are goal oriented.
In fact, the prot motive and the very existence of capitalist rms are examples
of social and historical contingency, and clearly for many purposes the analy-
sis can and should be rened to include additional context-specic elements;
changes in the nancial sphere, for instance, may a¤ect the ability of small
rms to obtain nance. Goal orientation, second, has important implications
for economic processes, as exemplied by the investment example. It is true,
of course, that because of uncertainty the desired rate of utilizationmay not
be sharply dened. But the notion that rms will keep investing at a constant
rate, even as utilization rates go to zero, fails the test of behavioral plausibility.
Goal oriented behavior does not account for all shifts in reduced-form relations.
Some shifts can be hard to explain, even ex post. But the presence of exogenous
shocks does not imply that no shifts can be explained.
4 Constrained optimization and formal model-
ing
Goal oriented behavior is often formalized mathematically as constrained op-
timization. Part of the objection to micro foundations may have to do with
this formalization. Dow (2007), among others, denes the divide between main-
stream and heterodox schools primarily in terms of mathematical formalism:
orthodoxy "being dened by mathematical formalism" and heterodoxy by the
"adoption of di¤erent methodological approaches" (p. 461).13
Mathematical formalism is distinct from goal oriented behavior. In the pre-
vious section I did use mathematical equations to describe key elements in the
argument but the equations merely served to clarify the reasoning. There was
no need to present rmsgoal orientation in the form of explicit maximization
programs. Formalization of this kind could potentially yield more precise im-
plications (which would of course be contingent on the particular assumptions
used in the formalizations). But formalization was not required to present a
general argument about the behavioral plausibility of the Kaleckian investment
function when rms are goal oriented and try to maximize prots.
13Dows argument, it seems to me, is setting up a straw man. Most mainstream economists
believe mathematical tools are immensely useful but I know of no mainstream economist who
would claim "the su¢ ciency of mathematical formalism as a methodological approach" (p.
461).
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Fgure 1: Piero della Francesca, "Baptism of Christ", c. 1448-1450.
To underline the distinction between goal orientation and formalization, con-
sider an example from a completely di¤erent arena. The art historian Baxandall
(1985) has suggested that paintings (and other works of art) be viewed as "solu-
tions to problems in situations" (p. 35). The jargon is di¤erent but solutions to
problems in situations would seem to translate into constrained optimization
in economese. I bring this up, not to advocate a Becker-like imperialism but to
suggest, in some ways, precisely the opposite.
The argument that typically agents behave in a goal oriented manner does
not imply that the standard mathematical formalism will always be useful. Us-
ing one of Baxandalls examples, the Italian renaissance painter Piero della
Francesca was commissioned to paint his Baptism of Christ by "men with
complicated fteenth-century needs embodied in subtly and implicitly dened
fteenth-century genres" (p.105). Piero brought to this task a set of histori-
cally and culturally specic skills, including a thorough knowledge of pictorial
perspective, and the nished picture represents his solution to this constrained
optimization problem. An attempt to formalize the process and the solution
mathematically  replete with utility function, technological and budget con-
straints makes no sense. But that does not mean that no insights can be gained
from looking at the painting as the result of an intentional process. Thus, the
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example may illustrate the potential fruitfulness of thinking in terms of goal
orientation as well as the context specicity of behavior and the limitations of
formalization.
Having stressed the limitations of formalization, let me add that in my view
some common claims about these limitations are unfounded. Dow (2007) links
a rejection of mathematical formalism and optimizing behavior to the openness
of the economic system:14
Open systems, which allow for human agency (creativity, the non-
deterministic exercise of choice, etc.) and the (indeterminate) evolu-
tion of the institutional structure within which individuals exercise
agency, do not have the invariant kind of causal mechanisms which
yield up laws, and allow instead for a plurality of explanations and
modes of explanation (p. 452)
I nd these arguments confusing. Of course the economic system is open.
But as Hodgson (2001, p. 35) puts it, "the policy towards science must be plu-
ralistic and tolerant, but science itself must be intolerant of what it regards as
falsehood". The openness of the system does not imply that falsehoods should
be tolerated and that a plurality of explanations of the same phenomenon is in-
trinsically good. Moreover, the openness of the system and the complexities of
the dynamic interactions do not eliminate or reduce the need for formalization.
On the contrary, dynamic interactions make it almost impossible to achieve
progress without formalization (which needless to say is not to claim that for-
mal models are su¢ cient for progress). It may be di¢ cult to keep track of
simultaneous interactions without formalization and dynamic interactions only
serves to compound those di¢ culties.
A valid point may remain. A heavy emphasis on formal modeling techniques
involves signicant dangers. Worswick (1959, p. 121) commented that
It is sometimes thought that the objection to the use of mathematics
in economics is that it is too hard. The more serious objection,
however, is that it is much too easy.
The ease of mathematical manipulation may lead to a neglect of those issues
that are hard to formalize or, equally dangerous, to a distortion in the way we
look at those problems that are being analyzed. Formal mathematical analysis
may also lead to a focus on mathematical elegance and a refusal to deal with
the messiness of real history. These dangers of a xation on formal techniques
notwithstanding, a refusal to formalize arguments that can be formalized carries
its own dangers, and arguably these dangers are equally serious.
14See also Chick and Dow (2001), Lawson (2009) and for a detailed critique Mohun and
Venziani (2012).
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5 Concluding remarks
Following the Lucas critique, mainstream macro has pursued micro founded
models based on the explicit optimization by representative agents. The result
has been a long and wasteful detour with enormous costs, both in terms of
the loss of knowledge in the profession and, more importantly, mistaken policy.
Heterodox macro is in a better state than its mainstream counterpart (which
does not say much) but also has its problems.
Having been critical of old Keynesians (who were often indiscriminately la-
beled as neoclassical or bastard Keynesians) and having rightly rejected the
Chicago inspired shifts in mainstream macro, the heterodox tradition has bi-
furcated. Some strands of heterodox macro emphasize structural and macro
constraints to such an extent that micro behavior is almost forgotten; other
strands disaggregate completely and view the macro as the emergent proper-
ties of an agent-based system with agents that follow simple behavioral rules.
Important insights may come from both of these di¤erent approaches. Purely
structuralist analyses of macro systems can highlight important interactions,
and computer-based methods allow us to examine interactions of a complexity
that go beyond what traditional techniques can provide. But in their rejection
of the micro foundationsof mainstream macro, the heterodox traditions are in
danger of throwing out the baby with the bath water.
Methodologically, Keynes and the old Keynesiansgot it about right (and
whatever methodological di¤erences existed between Keynes and the old Key-
nesians, it is their similarities that seem striking compared to the contemporary
mainstream). Keynes and Keynesians like Tobin and Solow were keenly aware
that good macroeconomics requires an understanding of the behavior of indi-
vidual rms and households and they rightly insisted that this behavior is to a
large extent goal oriented. They also realized that the implications of goal ori-
entation are not always straightforward and transparent. The step from micro
to macro is complicated, both because of technical aggregation issues which
imply that the aggregate behavior cannot be derived from the optimization of
an invariant representative agent and because the goals and the constraints
under which individual agents pursue these goals depend on the historical and
institutional context.
I am not advocating a return to the Keynesian economics that dominated
the eld until the mid 1970s. The old models had many problems: they largely
ignored distributional issues, for instance, and the dynamics was weakly devel-
oped. We should draw an all the techniques and insights that have emerged over
the last 35 years, both from heterodox economics and from the Post Walrasian
developments discussed by Colander (2003). But a broad vision is needed to
hold together and help interpret the ndings from these diverse techniques.
Holt et al. (2010, p. 5) seem to question the need for an anchor of this kind.
The post Walrasian vision, they argue,
sees the economy as so complicated that simple analytical models
of the aggregate economy models that can be specied in a set of
11
analytically solvable equations are not likely to be helpful in un-
derstanding many of the issues that economists want to address. ...
we have to go into the trenches, and base our analysis on experi-
mental and empirical data. From there we build up, using whatever
analytic tools we have available. This is di¤erent from the old vision
where economists mostly did the opposite of starting at the top and
then built down.
It is never a question of only "building up" or only "building down"; all would
agree on that, I expect. But I do worry about too much "building up". Dutt
raised a related issue in his comments on Colander (2003) arguing that "the
contributions he describes as Post Walrasian do not amount to an approach
to economics but really constitute a collection of more or less interesting ap-
proaches" and that these approaches "are unlikely to coalesce to form a challenge
to neoclassical orthodoxy" (p. 63)
.
Figure 2: Pablo Picasso, "Violin and
grapes", 1912.
Let me try to illustrate the need for an anchor using another simple example
from the art world. Painters have been struggling with the problem of how to
present a three dimensional world with time as a fourth, irreversible dimen-
sion on a at canvas. Many di¤erent solutions have been suggested; Pieros
use of perspective is one example. Cubism o¤ered another approach. Like a
pluralist economist who recognizes that there is no single correct theory, a cu-
bist painter tries to represent di¤erent views within the same frame. But as
12
noted by Gombrich (1989, p. 45), the cubist method of building up the image
has a problem
of which the originators of Cubism were very well aware. It can be
done only with more or less familiar forms. Those who look at the
picture must know what a violin looks like to be able to relate the
various fragments of the picture to each other.
Eclectic or pluralist macroeconomists face a similar problem. The frag-
mented inputs from the large range of possible neostructuralist closuresand
post Walrasian models can be illuminating, but the partial insights that they
o¤er must come together as elements of a larger picture. Methodologically the
traditional Keynesian approach o¤ers a good starting point for this larger pic-
ture. The Lucas prescriptions are mistaken but macroeconomists need to take
seriously the implications of goal oriented behavior at the micro level: they must
be able to tell an integrated story about goal-oriented micro behavior in a spe-
cic macro environment, and it can be useful to lay out this story in relatively
simple analytical models.
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